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Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law
Michael L. Perlin*

Introduction 1
!he question of the right to refuse antipsychotic medication remains the most
1mp~rtant and volatile aspect of the legal regulation of mental health practice. 2
The issues that are raised- the autonomy of institutionalized mentally disabled
individuals to refuse the imposition of treatment that is designed (at least in
part) to ameliorate their symptomatology, the degree to which individuals
subJected to such drugging are in danger of developing irreversible neurological
side effects, the evanescence of terms such as ''informed consent" or "competency," the practical and administrative considerations of implementing such a
right in an institutional setting, and the range of the philosophical questions
raised 3 - mark the litigation that has led to the articulation of the right to
refuse treatment as "a turning point in institutional psychiatry',4 and "the most
controversial issue in forensic psychiatry today". 5 Perhaps the most compelling,/
issues raised by the right to refuse antipsychotic medication are the potential
infringement of individuals' constitutional rights, including the First Amendment rights to privacy and mentation, the Sixth Amendment right to a fair
trial, the Eighth Amendment right to freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guar.antee. Given the
multiplicity and gravity of the issues involved in these cases, their significance
frequently transcends the narrow focus of a "mental disability law" case.
•Professor of Law, New York Law School, 57 Worth St,, New York, NY 10013, ms.A.
A version of this article will appear as a chapter in The Law and Mental Disability, forthcoming from
The Michie Co., Charlottesville, VA.
The author wishes to thank Debbie Dorfman for her extraordinary research assistance and Susan Perepeluk for her excellent editing assistance.
'The text infra accompanying notes 2-14 is generally adapted from Perlin, The Righi to Refuse Treatment
in a Criminal Law Selling, in FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK (R. Rosner ed. 1992)
(in press), manuscript at 1-3.
1
See generally, Brooks, The Right io Refuse Antipsychotlc Medications: Law and Policy, 39 RUTGERS L.
REv. 339 (1987); Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugging: Atomistic and Structural Remedies, 32 CLEVELAND
ST. L. REv. 221 (1983-4); Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Righi to Refuse Tnalment, 72 NORTHWESTERN
L. REv. 461 (1977).
lSee generally, 2 M . L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABJLJTY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (1989), Chapter 5, at
215-438.
•see generally, Rhoden, The Righi to Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. CIV. RIOHTS-CJV. LIBERTIES
L. REv. 363, 365 (1980).
5See generally, Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo and Rogers: The Burger Court and Mental Health Law Reform
Litigation, 4 J. LEO. MED. 323, 345 (1983).
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The conceptual, social, moral, legal, and medical difficulties inherent in the
articulation of a coherent right to refuse treatment doctrine have been made
even more complicated by the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to
confront most of the underlying issues in cases arising in civil settings. 6 As a
result of the court's decision in Mills v. Rogers to "sidestep" the core constitutional questions' and its concomitant articulation of the doctrine that a state is
always free to grant more rights under its constitution than might be minimally
mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court under the federal constitution, 8 two
parallel sets of cases have emerged.
In one, state courts have generally entered broad decrees in accordance with
an "expanded due process" model, in which the right to refuse treatment has
been read broadly and elaborately, generally interpreting procedural due process protections liberally on behalf of the complaining patient. These cases
have frequently mandated premedication judicial hearings, and heavily relied
on social science data focusing on the potential impact of drug side effects,
especially tardive dyskinesia. 9 In the other, federal courts have generally entered more narrow decrees in accordance with a "limited due process model."
These provided narrower administrative review and rejected broad readings of
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive and procedural due process protections, relying less on social science data (which was frequently ignored or
dismissed as part of an incomprehensible system allegedly beyond the courts'
self-professed limited competency). 10 Generally (but not always), the state cases
involved civil patients; more frequently, the federal cases dealt with individuals
originally institutionalized because of involvement in the criminal trial · process.11
As this short overview should demonstrate, it is impossible to authoritatively
articulate on.e doctrine to cover all right to refuse treatment litigation. It is
also impossible to state such a doctrine even for cases that arise in a "criminal
law setting," since the simplest "unpacking" of that category reveals that there
are at least seven major subcategories to which the right to refuse could be
applied: to cases involving (a) defendants awaiting incompetency to stand trial
6
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). But compare, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), and
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 U.S. 1810 (1992), discussed in Perlin & Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the
Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, ll BEHAv. Set. & L.-(1992) (in press), manuscript
at 38-42.
7
2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §S.33 at 309-12; Wexler, Seclusion and Restraint: Lessons for Law,
Psychiatry and Psychology, 5 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 285,290 (1982).
8
Mills, 4S7 U.S. at 300; see generally, Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the
Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier? 20 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1249 (1987).
9
See e.g., Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y. 2d 485, 495 N.B.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986); Riese v. St. Mary's
Hospital & Medical Center, 198 Cal.App.3d 1388, 243 Cal.Rptr. 2431 (1987), app'I. dismissed, 774 P.2d
698, 2S9 Cal.Rptr. 669 (1989); see generally, Perlin, Reading the Supreme Court's Tea Leaves: Predicting
Judicial Behavior in Civil and Criminal Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 12 AM. J. FORENS. PSYCHIATRY
39 (1991).
10
Se~ generally, United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane) cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.
1317 (1990); Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions? Stripping the Facade from
United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REv. 957 (1990). On the significance of courts' refusal to seriously
consider social science data in this context. see generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6.
11
See generally, Perlin, supra note 9.
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(1ST) determinations, (b) defendants found "permanently" IST in accordance
with the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana, 12 (c) defendants
otherwise awaiting trial in jails, (d) defendants seeking to proffer a not guilty
by reason of insanity (NORI) defense, (e) defendants who have been institutionalized following an NORI finding, (f) convicted defendants in prison, and
(g) capital defendants who state officials seek to medicate so as to make them
competent to be executed. 13 However, if each of these categories is considered
briefly, it may better illuminate whether any strands of doctrinal coherency
can be spelled out. 14
Doctrinal analysis has been made even more difficult by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Riggins v. Nevada. 15 There, the Court followed the "expanded due process" model in finding that defendant's due process rights to a
fair trial (at which he had raised the insanity defense) were violated by the
involuntary imposition of antipsychotic drugs, and requiring "an overriding
justification and a determination of medical appropriateness" prior to such
forcible medication. 16 The majority's decision in Riggins is by no means an
end to the debate surrounding the rights of the mentally disabled to refuse
antipsychotic medication. On one hand, Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion
would have banned the use of antipsychotic medication to make a defendant
fit to stand trial "absent an extraordinary showing" on the state's part; 17 on the
other, Justice Thomas's dissent appears to reject the notion that a defendant
such as Riggins (who had originally asked for medical assistance as a jail
inmate because he was "hearing voices") could ever raise a refusal of medication claim within the criminal trial context. 18
In order to understand the scope and breadth of this right, it is necessary to
try to "decode" it. We must try to separate its component parts, examine its
· constitutional roots, determine the "spin" factors that will likely drive future
decisions in areas in which there have not yet been significant litigation, 19 and
try to determine whether "doctrinal coherence" can ever be achieved in this
area.
This article will proceed in the following way. In: the "State and Federal
Systems" section, I discuss the lack of consistency within the state and federal
judiciary system in dealing with these cases. In "Other Settings and Different
Populations," I discuss the application of the right to refuse medication in
other settings for different population, such as jails, community facilities, and
state schools for retarded persons. In "Decoding the Right to Refuse Treat11

406 U.S. 715 (1972).
Beyond the scope of this article are yet other categories such as convicted defendants who are placed on
probation or parole if they agree to comply with medication orders, and defendants found guilty but
mentally ill (GBMI).
14
C/. Perlin, The Supreme Court, Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random
Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal Abyss"? 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1987).
15
112 U.S. 1810 (1992).
16
/d. at 1815.
17
/d. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
18
/d. at 1822-26 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19
See generally, Perlin, supra note 9.
13
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ment/' I consider some of the reasons why courts decide right to refuse treatment cases the way they do, looking at the use of cognitive simplifying devices
such as "heuristics," the impact of "sanism" on judicial decision-making, and
the danger of "pretextuality" in the decision of such cases; I also stress the
importance of ''therapeutic jurisprudence" as an interpretive tool in considering right to refuse treatment law. 20 I will also consider the potential future
impact of the Riggins case in this area. 21 Finally, I offer some final "decoding"
suggestions.
State and Federal Systems22

It is important to begin this inquiry in the context of the particular time in
legal history that institutional right to refuse litigation began. The timing of
the emergence of this case law and public scrutiny in the late 1970s was no
coincidence. The strategic impetus for this litigation flowed from decisions
earlier in the decade on behalf of institutionalized individuals that had repudiated the "hands off' doctrine23 in a wide variety of cases broadening the applicability of both procedural and substantive due process protections to institutionalized individuals. 24 While this litigation first arose in the state prison and
jail settings, 25 lawyers representing the mentally disabled- a classically "hidden" and disenfranchised group26 - began to turn to the federal courts in an
effort to seek vindication of fundamental constitutional and civil rights, 27 at
first primarily in cases involving the right to treatment. 28 In the first rush
of cases - arising from fact settings involving shocking disclosures of patient
brutality, mistreatment, and abuse29 - federal judges openly embraced an activU)See e.g., THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW As A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (D. Wexler & 8. Winick
eds. 1991).
21
See Perlin, Riggins v. Nevada: Forced Medication Collides With the Right to a Fair Trial, 16 NEWSLETTER AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.-(Dec. 1992) (in print).
~he text iefra accompanying notes 23-60 is largely adapted from Perlin, supra note 9.
23
See e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F. 2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 854 (1954); Siegel v.
Ragan, 180 F. 2d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1950). See generally, Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of
Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L. J. 506 (1963).
24
See generally, Perlin, supra note 8, at 1249-52; 1 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §1.03, at 5-9.
"See generally, Alexander, The New Prison Administrators and the Court: New Directions in Prison
Law, 56 TEx. L. REv. 963, 964--65 (1978).
26
See e.g.: City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 461-62 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part) (mentally retarded individuals have been subject to "'lengthy and
tragic' history of segregation and discrimination that can only be called grotesque''). See generally, United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938).
27
M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §1.03, at 8. The seminal article explaining the court's role in such litigation
remains Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976).
28
See generally, 2 M. L. PERLIN, supra note 3, Chapter 4.
29
See e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 755-56
(E.D.N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305, 1311 n.6 (5th Cir. 1974):
One [Alabama state hospital patient] died after a garden hose had been inserted into his
rectum for five minutes by a working patient who was cleaning him; one died when a fellow
patient hosed him with scalding water; another died when soapy water was forced into his
mouth; and a fourth from a self-administration of drugs which had been inadequately secured.
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ist model that ''transfigured institutional care of the mentally ill in the nation."30
By the time the litigation largely shifted focus from the "right to treatment"
to the "right to refuse treatment,'' some recession from this position was noticeable. 31 Refusal of treatment litigation challenged the autonomy and authority
of state hospital doctors to provide what had been considered as "standard"
treatment: the administration of psychotropic medication to institutionalized,
mentally ill patients32 -on the surface, a seeming-far cry from the type of
"shock the conscience" physical brutality present in the prototypic right to
treatment case of Wyatt v. Stickney. 33 Thus, even in Rennie v. Klein, one of
the broadest, most scholarly and most sensitive of the first generation of right
to refuse treatment cases, Judge Stanley Brotman eloquently and candidly laid
out the dilemma facing him: "A little knowledge can be dangerous, and this
court is hesitant to diagnose mental illness and prescribe medication. "34
Later, when the Third Circuit first modified Judge Brotman's decision in
Rennie, it limited the substantive and procedural sweep of its protections, and
recalibrated its reading of the "least restrictive alternative'' construct. 3s The
Third Circuit warned carefully about overintrustion by the courts into the daily
operation of mental institutions:
3

°Heller, Extension of Wyatt to Ohio Forensic Patients, in WYATT V. STICKNEY: RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT 161, 172 (L.R. Jones & R. Parlour eds. 1981) (RETROSPECT).
31
This recession did not affect the earliest right to refuse cases that had involved the forcible administration
of drugs for purely punitive purposes. See e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F. 2d 1136, 1137-40 (8th Cir. 1973)
(use of apomorphine as "aversive stimuli''}; Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F. 2d 877-78 (9th Cir. 1973) (use of
succinylcholine as aversive conditioning).
32
0n the interplay between the administration of such medication and the historic roots of deinstitutionalization, see Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 29
Hous. L. REV. 63, 102-04 (1991).
33
325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), afjd sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305 (5th ar. 1974);
see also, Drake, The Development of Wyatt in the Courtroom, in RETROSPECT, supra note 29, at 36
(characterizing "horror" of pre-Wyatt institutions in Alabama). As the right to refuse litigation developed,
it became clear that this dichotomy was frequently illusory. See e.g., Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1302 (hospital
staff increased patient's medication as "reprisal" for his decision to contact an attorney).
''Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1140. The question in Rennie, Judge Brotman found, tracked the question
asked rhetorically by Judge Bazelon: "[H]ow real is the promise of individual autonomy for a confused
person set adrift in a hostile world?" Id. at 1146, quoting Bazelon, Institutionalization, Deinstitutionalization, and the Adversary Process,. 75 CoLUM, L. REV. 897,907 (1975).
3
iThe Rennie trial court had extended the doctrine of the "least restrictive alternative" - regularly employed
previously in mental health litigation to questions of custodial settings, see. e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F.
Supp. 487, SOI (D. Minn. 1974)-to medication choices. See Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1146, quoting Winick,
Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial, 1977 AM. BAR. FOUND. REs. J. 769,813 (patient
"may challenge the forced administration of drugs on the basis that alternative treatment methods should be
tried before a more intrusive technique like psychotropic medication is used").
The Supreme Court has never squarely confronted the application of the "least restrictive alternative"
principle to such cases. Compare Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (involuntarily committed
mentally retarded individual has right to "reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions''}. But see,
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992) (while no bright line test set out for medical appropriateness in
context of insanity defense pleader's right to refuse during trial, due process requires a demonstration by the
state that the treatment was medically appropriate and either (a) considering less intrusive alternatives,
essential for the defendant's safety or the safety of others, or (b) considering less intrusive means, essential
for an adjudication of guilt or innocence).

MICHAEL L. PERUN

156

This is not to say that the least intrusive means requires hourly or
daily judicial oversight. Obviously that would be an unworkable
standard. Rather, what is reviewable is whether the choice of a
course of treatment strikes a proper balance between efficacy and
intrusiveness. 36
The Supreme Court, however, gave little guidance. In 1982, in Mills v.
Rogers,31 a case that arose contemporaneously with Rennie, 38 it sidestepped
the constitutional issues by remanding the case to the First Circuit for consideration of the impact of an intervening Massachusetts state court decision. 39 The
Supreme Court then remanded Rennie40 in light of its contemporaneous decision in Youngberg v. Romeo,41 that had, in establishing a minimal right to
training for institutionalized mentally retarded individuals, announced as its
benchmark for assessing patients' rights claims the test of "substantial professional judgment.',42 On remand (in Rennie II), a sharply divided Third Circuit
reiterated most of its earlier holding that involuntarily committed patients do
have a qualified right to refuse the administration of psychotropics, 43 but, as
part of its holding, relied on Youngberg in jettisoning the "least restrictive
alternative" standard for drugging decisions. 44
In the wake of Youngberg, Rogers, and Rennie II, the focus of litigation
turned swiftly to state courts, and state constitutional law became an increasingly more important vehicle through which right to refuse claims were assessed. 45 In Rivers v. Katz, 46 a paradigm state constitutional law case, the New
York Court of Appeals concluded that state constitutions afforded involuntary
patients a fundamental right to refuse, holding that neither mental illness nor
institutionalization per se could stand as a justification for overriding such a
right on either police power or parens patriae grounds. 47 State cases such as
36

Rennie, 653 F. 2d at 847. See also, e.g., Rogers, 634 F. 2d at 656-57 (in accord).

37

457 U.S. 291 (1982).
At the trial level, the District Court had originally entered-even a broader antidrugging injunction than
had Judge Brotman done in Rennie. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), mod., 634 F.
2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand,
738 F. 2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
39
Mills, 457 U.S. at 306, remanding in light of In Re Richard Roe III, 383 Mass. 415,421 N.E. 2d 40, 5152 (1981) (holding that a noninstitutionalized incompetent patient had a right to a prior judicial hearing at
which he could assert the desire to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment). See supra text accompanying note
7.
40
457U.S.1119(1982).
41
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
42
/d, at 323 ("Liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible did not base the decision on such a judgment"). The Supreme Court's recent decision in Riggins
v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 ( 1992), may be read to be questioning the continuing vitality of this doctrine in
right to refuse contexts. See supra note 35.
43
Rennie, 720 F. 2d at 269-70.
44
/d. at 270.
4
isee Perlin, supra note 8.
38

46

47

67 N.Y. 2d 485,495 N.E. 2d 337,504 N.Y.S. 2d 74 (1986).
See generally, 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, at §§5.42-5.43A.
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48

Rivers rejected arguments that involuntarily committed patients were "presumptively incompetent" because of their institutionalization. 49 Thus, in the
case of a competent patient, the right ''to determine what shall be done with
[one's] body" must be honored "even though the recommended treatment may
be beneficial or even necessary to preserve the patient's life. "50
Cases such as Rivers and the California state decision in Riese v. St. Mary's
Hospital and Medical Center 1 thus made it appear that the federal forum was,
simply, a venue of the past for the adjudication of right to refuse treatment
cases. 52 Moreover, it appeared that the jurisprudential inquiries engaged in by
the federal courts were simply irrelevant to state court judges. The Rivers
opinion, for instance, was silent on the jurisdictional split that followed the
Mills remand. 53 It astonishingly did not even mention the opinion in Project
Release v. Prevost, 54 where the Second Circuit (the federal circuit that includes
New York) had upheld the constitutionality (on federal constitutional
grounds)55 of the very regulation struck down on state constitutional grounds
by the Rivers court.
Rivers ringingly endorsed a preadministration judicial hearing in right to
refuse cases where the patient was not a present danger. This stands in sharp
contrast to the methodology implicitly endorsed by the United States Supreme
Court that apparently seemed to accept a more informal, medically focused
model so as to adequately satisfy the demands of the due process clause of the
federal constitution, 56 that would employ the "substantial professional judgment" test as the benchmark of institutional treatment adequacy, 57 and that
48

0ther similar cases are cited in id., §5.43A, at 33-34 n. 846.2 (1992 pocket part).
'9The court reasoned that, without more, neither the fact of mental illness or commitment "constitutes a
sufficient basis to conclude that [such patients] lack the mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of
their decision to refuse medication that poses a significant risk to their physical well-being." Rivers, 504
N.Y.S. 2d at 78, 79. On the ways that courts frequently subvert this doctrine in the trials of involuntary civil
commitment and incompetency to stand trial cases, see Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: A Case
of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. -(1993) (in print).
"'Id. at 78. On the empirical impact of Rivers, see e.g., Zito, Haimowitz, Wanderling & Mehta, One Year
Under Rivers: Drug Refusal in a New York State Psychiatric Facility, 12 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 295
(1989); Coumos, McKinnon & Adams, A Comparison of Clinical and Judicial Procedures I or Reviewing
Requests/or Involuntary Medication in New York, 39 HosP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 851 (1988).
51
.
209 Cal. App. 3d 1303, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1987), appeal dismissed, 774 P. 2d 698, 259 Cal. Rptr. 609
(1989).
52
See Perlin, supra note 8, at 1265 (''the use of state constitutions and state statutes in state courts may be
the last frontier for the mentally disabled").
53
See 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.46, at 364-66.
"722 F. 2d 960 {2d Cir. 1983).
.
55
Id. at 980-81. I discuss this anomaly in 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.43, at 347.
!!(,See e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322-23 {"[T]here certainly is no reason to think judges or juries are
better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions (about internal operations of state
mental institutions]''); Roth, The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment: Law and Medicine at the Interface,
35 EMORY L.J. 139, 157 (1986) {"while the 'right to refuse' is a fascinating issue for law and psychiatry, the
problem remains clinical"). Compare Riggins, supra (discussed in this context in M. Perlin, "Law As a
Therapeutic and Anti-Therapeutic Agent" (paper presented at University of Massachusetts' Medical Center's
Department of Psychiatry's annual conference, May 1992, Auburn, MA), and in Perlin, supra note 21.
51

See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
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would not constitutionally compel adherence to the "least restrictive alternative'' in institutional drugging cases.s 8
The subsequent decision by the Fourth Circuit in Untied States v. Charters,
severely limiting the rights of pretrial detainees to refuse medication and requiring only the most minimalist compliance with the Youngberg professional
judgment test, appeared to augur the demise of the federal court as a forum
for right to refuse cases. s9 However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Riggins v. Nevada may have served to resuscitate federal courts as the site for
litigation in such cases. 60
Other Settings and Different Populations61

Although the great bulk of right to refuse treatment litigation has involved
institutionalized, mentally ill persons, more recent cases have also dealt with
the application of the right in other facilities (e.g., jails, the community, state
schools for retarded persons) and to cases involving special populations (e.g.,
persons found NORI). While these cases are still relatively numerically few, 62
they at least indicate that the scope of the problem extends beyond simple
decision making involving civilly committed mental patients. Also, the fact
that the Supreme Court recently addressed the question of the refusal of medication in the context of a fair trial question in Riggins v. Nevada63 should
likely lead to greater attention paid to this area in the future.

In Civil Settings
In Facilities for Mentally Retarded Persons. The litigated constitutional64
cases dealing with the rights of residents of state schools for the retarded to
refuse the administration of antipsychotic drugs have focused on the use of
drugs as punishment within the larger context of right to treatment/institutional conditions litigation. 6s Thus, in Welsch v. Likins, 66 the district court
8

In its resurrection of the "least restrictive alternative" standard, Rivers made no mention of the Younsberg decision.
'

59
See Perlin, suprQ note 10, discussing United States v. Charters, 863 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane),
cert. den., 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990). See infra Pan III BL
tJJSee supra notes 15-18; M. Perlin, supra note 56; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6; Perlin, supra note 21.
61
The text infra accompany notes 62-74 is generally adapted from 2 M.L. PBRLIN, supra note 3, §§5.615.62, and id. (1992 pocket part).
62
On the question of the application of the right to individuals in private hospitals, see Riese v. St. Mary's
Hosp. & Med. Center, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1987), appeal dismissed, 259 Cal. Rptr.
669, 774 P. 2d 698 (1988), discussed in 2 M.L. PBRLIN, supra note 3, at §5.63.
On the question of the application of the right to voluntary patients, see Perlin, supra note 9, at SO.
63
112 s. Ct. 1810 (1992).
64
See also, e.g., In re A.C., 144 Vt. 37, 470 A.2d 1191 (1984) (statutory case).
65
See, e.g., Plotkin & Gill, Invisible Manacles: Drugging Mentally Retarded People, 31 STAN. L. RBv.

637, 674 (1979) (the "pervasive misuse of phenothiazines in most public institutions for mentally retarded
persons is beyond question").
66
373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974). See generally 2 M.L. PBRLIN, supra note 3, at §4.19.
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found that the "excessive use of tranquilizing medication as a means of controlling behavior, not mainly as part of therapy, may ... infringe on ~laintiffs'
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment. "6 And, in
Wyatt v. Stickney, 68 the district court's standards included elaborate procedures governing the use of such medication. 69

In the Community. 70 (a) Outpatient commitment. It is necessary to consider
the interplay between the right to refuse treatment and outpatient commitment
(OPC). 71 Under OPC statutes, individuals in need of treatment ''to prevent
further disability or deterioration which would predictably result in dangerousness,'' who are "capable of surviving safely in the community," but are unable
to make informed decisions ''to seek voluntary treatment or comply with rec. ommended treatment," are subject to commitment to community-based facilities. 72 Statutes typically look at medication compliance as one of the criteria
for involving OPC, 73 and much of the relevant case law seems to explicitly
endorse this use of OPC. 74
.
Forced drugging in the community has thus been characterized as the "core
of OPC."15 A powerful critique of OPC argues that its effectiveness "depends
on being able to compel those who resist . . . psychotropic medication . . . to
67
Welsch, 373 F. Supp. at 503 (emphasis added). The court noted that the evidence in the case before it
reflected that such medication was used for "self-protection of residents and [because of) insufficient staffing." Id.
61
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp.
373, 380 (M.D. Ala.), 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), qfjd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Wyatt is discussed extensively in 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §§4.07-4.19.
·

69

Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 400.
'7he text illfra accompanying notes 71-89 is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 9, at 50-52.
71
See generally, Hoge & Appelbaum, Legal Issues in Outpatient Psychiatry, in OUTPATIENT PSYCHIATRY:
DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 605 (A. Lazare ed. 2d ed. 1989).
72
Seee.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §122C-263(d)(l).
73
See e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §51.20(dm) (OPC permissible if court finds dangerousness of patient "is
likely to be controlled with appropriate medication administered on an outpatient basis"); TENN. CODE
· ANN. §33-6-20l(b) (2) (allowing OPC where patient is subject to the "obligation to participate in any
medically appropriate outpatient treatment, including •.• medication • • • ").
14
In re Anderson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 38, 140 Cal. Rptr. 546,550 (1977) (medication an appropriate condition
of outpatient treatment). Compare In re Richardson, 481 A. 2d 473, 479 n. 5 ( D.C. 1984) ("Not every
instance of the outpatient's failure to take prescribed medication or attend therapy sessions justifies the
·
conclusion that he is not cooperating with the treatment program").
"Stefan, Preventive Commitment: The Concepts and Its Pitfalls, ll MENT. & PHYS. Drs. L. RPTR. 288,
294 (1987); see also, J . La Fond, "The Homeless Mentally Ill: Is Coercive Psychiatry the Answer?" (paper
presented at annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Section on Law and Mental
Disability, January 1990, San Francisco, CA) (in outpatient settings, "[d]rugs-with all their risks-will
undoubtedly be the treatment of choice"); Gelman, Mental Hospital Drugs: Professionalism and the Constitution, 72 GEO. L.J. 1725, 1750 (1984):
7

Drugs make custody possible without its traditional physical trappings. To house a drugged
population, the thick walls, physical barriers, geographical isolation, and staff supervision of
state mental hospitals are generally unnecessary.
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follow a prescribed regimen of care."76 This argument must be considered in
the context of recent literature that charges that community mental health
services have never been truly accessible to former state hospital patients, 77
and of recent case law that holds that Community Mental Health Centers
(CMHCs) have the right to refuse admission to state hospital outpatients. 78 If
OPC's success depends on the dedication of CMHCs to "making [it] work,"
the concern that such facilities may pay only "lip service" to the status makes
us reconsider OPC as a tool by which to enforce community drugging. 79
It is also necessary to consider the interrelationship between homelessness80
and the right to refuse treatment. 81 While common wisdom seems to suggest
that one of the key factors in the creation of deinstitutionalization policies was
the mass marketing of psychiatric drugs, 82 there has been virtually no exploration of the impact of forced public hospital drugging on increased homelessness.
It has been argued that side effects such as akinesia and akathesia have the
inevitable effect of retarding social skill progress and of making ex-patients
76
Schwartz & Costanzo, Compelling Treatment in the Community: Distorted Doctrines and Violated
Values, 20 LOY, L.A. L. REV. 1329, 1384 (1987).
In one unreported case, a state administrative agency ruled that it was improper to terminate an ex-mental
patient from a community mental health program because she refused to take an antipsychotic drug. In this
case, the agency director found that termination was too harsh of a penalty, since there was no testimony in
the record as to: (1) the effects of the drug (Haldol); or (2) _the possible harm that would be caused to the
petitioner or others as a result of her refusal. In re FHD 80-042, No. H.D.Y. 2400-80 (N.J. Dep't of Human
Servs. Oct. 10, 1980), reported at 5 MENT. Dis. L. REP. 41 (1981).
In addition, there had been no efforts made to resolve the matter by either prescribing a different drug or
a lesser amount of the drug in question. Finally, the community mental health center's contract with the
state contained "no clause or provision which require[d] clients to surrender complete control of the selection
of the type and 'a mount of the medication that will be prescribed to them in order for them to remain in the
program." Id.
77
See E. F. TORREY, NOWHERE To Go: T HE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 13860 (1988).
78
Rhode Island Dept. of Mental Health v. R.B., 549 A. 2d 1028, 1031 (R.I. 1988).
79
Hiday & Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina Experience With Outpatient Commitment: A Critical Ap-'
praisal, 10 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 215, 230-31 (1987). See generally, Perlin, supra note 49, at 121-22.
80
See generally, 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, at §§7,23-7.27.
81
See generally, Perlin, supra note 32, at 104-06.
82
See e.g., E. F. TORREY, supra note 77, at 87-88 (use of drugs in state hospital "a miracle"). Compare id.
at 158 (criticizing court decisions such as Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), mod. 634 F.
2d 650 (1 Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded 457 U.S. 291 (1982), on remand 738 F. 2d 1 (1984), and Rennie
v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J, 1978), suppl. 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), mod. 653 F. 2d 836 (3
Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded 458 U.S. 1191 (1982), on remand 720 F. 2d 266 (3 Cir. 1983), for
permitting mentally ill individuals "once released from a hospital, to remain free and psychotic in the
community"), to Gelman, supra note 75, at 1727 n. 23 ("Drugging of the mentally ill in the 'c;:pmmunity' is
all but universal''). For a comprehensive analysis of all related issues involved in right to refuse ·m"edicaiion
decision making in community settings, see Schwartz & Costanzo, supra note 80, For a fuller consideration
of this issue, see Perlin, Book Review of A.B. JOHNSON, OUT OF BEDLAM: THE TRUTH ABOUT DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION (1990)), 8 N.Y. L. SCH. J, HUM. RTS. 557 (1991); Gould, ''Madness in the Streets" Rides
the Waves of Sanism (book review of R. J, ISAAC & v.c. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: How
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL (1990)), 9 N.Y, L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 567
(1992).
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even less employable once they are deinstitutionalized. 83 Notwithstanding the
drugs' apparent effectiveness in reducing the floridity of symptomatology and
lessening the excesses of psychic pain, 84 the linkage between these drug side
effects, the failure of patients to be meaningfully reintegrated into society after
their release, and homelessness has not yet been critically considered. The
linkage may be especially pernicious in light of the parallel literature illuminating the ways in which institutional dependency progressively leads to losses of
social and vocational competencies, precisely the sort of "competencies" that
are essential if homeless individuals are to reintegrate themselves meaningfully
into mainstream society. 85
There is now some hard evidence that some deinstitutionalized homeless
individuals remain on the streets to avoid regimens of compulsory drugging in
hospitals. 86 Parenthetically,. other researchers have learned that the deinstitutionalized homeless will accept medication in social service settings. 87 It is unclear whether other evidence- that the deinstitutionalized homeless reject the
alternative of mental hospitals 88 but frequently seek out medical care in general
13
Compare Rennie, 462 F . Supp. at 1146 (likelihood of patient contracting tardlve dysJdnesia ralses
question of whether "the cure would be worse than the illness''); Bellack & Mueser, A Comprehensive
Treatment Program for Schi:,.ophrenia and Chronic Mental Illness, 22 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J.
175, 177 (1980) (as many as 5007o of schizophrenics may not benefit from antipsychotic medication; such
medications do not help patients "develop skills of daily living that enhance the quality of life").
84

See Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1137:

·

Psychotropic drugs are effective in reducing thought disorders in a majority of schizophrenics. With first admission patients, success rates as high as 9S"lo have been obtained ..• Success
rates are less impressive with chronic patients ••• However, no other treatment modality has
achieved equal success in the treatment of schizophrenia .. •
"C. KEISLER & A. SIBULKIN, MENTAL HOSPITALIZATION: MYTHS AND FACTS AB<>UT A NATIONAL
CR1s1s 148 (1987), discussing McEwen, Continuities in the Study of Total and Non-total Institutions, 6 AM.
REV. SOCIOL. 143 (1980), and Goldstein, The Sociology of Mental Health and Illness, 5 AM. REV. SocIOL.
381 (1979).
16
See Fischer & Breakey, Homelessness and Mental Health: An Overview, 14 INT'L J. MENTAL HEALTH
6, 29 (1986), finding that a proportion of the mentally ill homeless have "opted out" of the mental health
system, preferring the "life of the streets" to the alternative of institutional life, and have elected to "live
with" the symptoms of mental illness rather than suffer from the unwanted side effects of antipsychotic
medication. This result may be seen, depending upon the reader's perspective, as good judgment or as
evidence of the degree to which mental illness has impaired the individual's thought systems. See id. (of a
series of 15 problem areas, mental illness was rated as 13th in importance by the homeless). See also,
Gelberg, Linn & Leake, Mental Health, Alcohol and Drug Use, and Criminal History Among Homeless
Adults, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 191, 193 (1988) (deinstitutionalized patients the least likely of the homeless
to sleep in emergency shelters).
87
Arce, Tadlock, Vergare & Shapiro, A Psychiatric Profile of Street People Admitted To an Emergency
Shelter, 34 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 812 (1983) (860Jo of the homeless mentally ill were willing to
comply with psychotropic medications in community support service settings); see generally Turner & TenHoor, The NIMH Community Support Program: Pilot Approach to a Needed Social Reform, 4 ScHIZ.
BULL. 319 (1978).
.
81
See Farr, A Mental Health Treatment Program for the Homeless Mentally Ill in the Los Angeles Skid
Row Area, in TREATING THE HOMELESS 64, 71 (B.E. Jones ed. 1986) (the "vast majority" of population
studied "would rather live in filth and be subjected to beatings and violence than to be institutionalized,
even in our finest mental hospitals'') (emphasis added).
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hospitals89 - can fully explain this paradox. It is clear, though, that further
attention must be paid to this inquiry.
(b) Involuntary civil commitment. 90 The only important issue being considered in the involuntary civil commitment process in recent reported appellate
decisions is whether a patient is "competent" to make the "right choice" and
self-medicate in the community if commitment is not ordered. 91 Here, courts
regularly and routinely weigh experts' predictions of a patient's potential refusal to take antipsychotic medication in a community setting as probativethe. most probative-evidence on the question of whether involuntary civil
commitment should be ordered.
Most of the reported cases rely here on psychiatric "expert" predictions as
the dispositive evidence. 92 Although there is widespread belief that refusal to
take such medication will make some patients more dangerous, 93 there is absolutely no evidence that psychiatrists have any special ability to predict community medication compliance. 94 There is also a body of evidence that suggests
that this population is comprised of precisely those individuals that many
community mental health centers do not want to treat. 95
Nevertheless, involuntary civil commitment is regularly ordered because testifying experts find it "doubtful" that the patient would self-medicate in the
community. 96 Thus, where the operative state statute included a presum;tion
that the subject of the commitment petition did not require treatment, and
where civil commitment required clear and convincing evidence of a "serious
89
See Silver, Voluntary Admission to New York City Hospitals: The Rights of the Mentally Ill Homeless,
19 CoLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REv. 399, 400-01 n. 3, 402-03 n. 5 (1988) (substantial numbers .of homeless
mentally ill seek treatment in emergency rooms of city general hospitals).
i!OJ'he material i,ifra accompanying notes 91-100 is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 49, manuscript at 83-92. ·
91
See generally, cases discussed in 1 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §3.45, at 71-73, nn. 726.1-741 (1992
pocket part); Perlin, supra note 32, at 116-17 nn. 306-08; Perlin, supra note 9, at 50-51.
92
For an example of a court rejecting this line of thinkipg, see In re J.S.C., 812 S.W. 2d 92, 95-96 (Tex.
App. 1991) (testimony that patient will deteriorate if he fails to take medication insufficient basis upon
which to sustain involuntary civil commitment determination).
93
Scheid-Cook, Commitment of the Mentally Ill to Outpatient Treatment, 23 COMMUN. MENT. HEALTH
J. 173, 180 (1987).
94-y'he literature reveals no studies on this question. A recent reconsideration of dangerousness studies lists
over 40 factors to be considered by experts in assessing probabilities of an individual's future violence;
community medication compliance is not included. Palermo, Liska, Palermo & Del Forno, On the Predictability of Violent Behavior: Considerations and Guidelines, 36 J. FORENS. Sc1. 1435, 1440 (1991), and see
id. at 1439 ("One should not deduce the possibility for future dangerousness from an isolated individual
trait").
9
'Scheid-Cook, supra note 93, at 181-82, citing, inter alia, Stern & Minkoff, Paradoxes in Programming
for Chronic Patients in a Community Clinic, 30 HOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 613 (1979); see also,
Schwartz & Costanzo, supra note 76, at 1386-89; A. B. JOHNSON, supra note 82, at 78.
96
1n Interest of L.B., 452 N.W. 2d 75, 77 (N. Dale. 1990). In the same case, an additional expert had
testified that the patient did not suffer from a mental illness.
A patient's refusal to accept antipsycbotic medication is also seen as a sufficient basis upon which to
reject voluntary commitment status. See e.g., Matter of J.B., 705 P. 2d 598, 602 (Mont. 1985); Wessel v.
Pryor, 461 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
117
N.D.C.C. §25-03.1.19; In re Kupperion, 331 N.W. 2d 22, 26 (N.Dak. 1985).
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98

risk of hann," a commitment order was affirmed where the experts testified
that the patient would "benefit" from medication and that the "only way"
such medication could be provided in a supervised basis was in a "structured
residential type of placement" and that ''if she was discharged from the hospital, she would quit taking her medication. "99
In Criminal Law Settings100
Defendants A waiting Trial. Prior to 1987, medication cases involving defendants awaiting 1ST determinations had "resulted in a series of apparently random decisions from which almost no doctrinal threads could be extracted,"
leading to "significant and genuine confusion" in this area. 101 More recently,
though, two separate decisions in one case-with radically different opinions appear to have brought some measure of coherence to this area. 102
In 1987, a panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the first
decision in United States v. Charters 103 (Charters I) on the right of a federal
pretrial detainee to refuse psychotropic medication. Charters I rejected the
notion that the "exercise of professional judgment standard" articulated by the
Supreme Court in Youngberg v. Romeo applied to antipsychotic medication
cases, resurrected right-to-privacy and freedom-of-thought-process arguments
that had been generally abandoned in the years since the Supreme Court's
decision in Mills v. Rogers, established a right to be free from unwanted
physical intrusion as an integral part of an individual's constitutional freedoms,
and articulated a complex substituted judiment-best interests methodology to
be used in right to refuse treatment cases. 1
·
On en bane rehearing, the full Fourth Circuit vacated the panel decision
(Charters JI), "suggesting that the panel was wrong about almost everything. "105 Although it agreed that the defendant possessed a constitutionally
retained interest in freedom from bodily restraint that was implicated by the
forced administration of psychotropic drugs and was protected "against arbi106
trary and capricious action by government officials," it found that informal
91
Defined as a "substantial deterioration in mental health which would predictably result in dangerousness
to that person, others, or property, based upon acts, threats, or patterns in the person's treatment, current
condition, and other relevant factors. N.D.C.C. §2S-03.1-02(10)(d).
99
Interest of R.N., 453 N.W. 2d 819, 822 (N.D. 1990).
1
i»rbe material iflfra accompanying notes 101-46 is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 1, manuscript at 4-13.
101
Perlin, supra note 10, at 963; compare e.g., State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A. 2d 1379 (1978), to
Whitehead v. Wainwright, 447 F. Supp. 898 (M.D. Fla. 1978), vacated and remanded on other gds., 609 F.
2d 223 (Sth Cir. 1980).
1111
But compare Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
103
829 F. 2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987) (Charters [), on rehearing, 863 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane)
(Charters II), cert. den., 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990).
104
See generally, Perlin, supra note IO; 2 M.L. PERLIN, supfa note 3, at §S.64.
10
'Perlin, supra note 10, at 965.
106
Charters, 863 F. 2d at 306.
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institutional administrative procedures were adequate to protect the defendant's due process interests. It applied the "substantial professional judgment"
test of Youngberg, and limited questioning of experts to one matter: "[W]as
this decision reached by a process so completely out of bounds as to make it
explicable only as an arbitrary, nonprofessional one?"107 Although the court
briefly acknowledged the possibility of side effects (a factor stressed heavily in
Charters ]), it quickly dismissed the magnitude of their potential harm by
noting that they were simply "one element" to be weighed in a best-interests
decision. Here, the court conceded that it did not do an "exhaustive analysis"
of the conflicting literature before it, demurring to that literature's importance:
It suffices to observe that, while there is universal agreement in
the professional discipline that side effects always exist as a risk,
there is wide dis~reement within those disciplines as to the degree
of their severity. 1

',:

The two views of the rights of pretrial detainees to refuse medication reflected in Charters I and Charters II could not be more diametrically opposed.
Also, the ultimate en bane decision has led to some important strategic decision
making. Although, as a federal detainee, Charters was forced to litigate in
federal court, in cases where litigants do have an option of availing themselves
of a state forum, it is now likely they will choose that jurisdictional alternative.
Charters II thus appeared to "signal the death knell for the litigation of right
to refuse treatment issues in the federal forum" in cases in which litigants
retain discretion as to where to sue. 109
•
ti

1i,,

,,11
t1

Defendants Permanently /ST. In Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme Court
held that it violated due process to commit an individual for more than the
"reasonable period of time" necessary to determine "whether there is a substantial chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable future. "110 If there were to be no such chance, a defendant originally committed
pursuant to an IST finding would either be subjected to the civil commitment
process or released; once having been "Jacksonized., (that is, having had their
criminal indictments dismissed but remaining in need of hospitalization), such
patients must be treated like other civil patients. 111
There has been virtually no case law on the rights of Jacksonized patients to
refuse medication; neither of the two pertinent cases substantially illuminates
the underlying doctrinal issues. 112 Charters II should not have a significant
1111

Id. at 313.
Id. at 310-11.
1
09perlin, supra note 10, at 994. On the pretextual nature of Charters II, see Perlin, supra note 49,
manuscript at 72-73.
110
406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972).
111
See Perlin, supra note 9, at 48-49.
112
See e.g., DeAngelas v. Plaut, 503 F. Supp. 775 (D. Conn. 1980); Mannix v. State, 621 S.W. 2d 222
(Ark. 1981); Perlin, supra note 9, at 62-63 n. 115; 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.65, at 75 (1992 pocket
part).
108
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impact on this population who should be treated like other civil patients (due
to the dismissal of the underlying indictments that triggered their entry into
the criminal trial process). Thus, it can be expected that future developments
here will track similar developments involving involuntarily committed civil
patients, and more closely adhere to the "expanded due process" model.
Otherwise A waiting Trial in Jails. Cases involving jailed pretrial detainees
have generally interpreted the right to refuse treatment broadly. In Bee v.
Greaves, the Tenth Circuit ruled that "less restrictive alternatives" should be
ruled out before psychotropic medication is involuntarily administered to a
jailed detainee; 113 other courts have similarly ruled that the availability of a
less intrusive alternative that could have been employed by defendants must
be considered in the determination of such a case. 114 Bee has been read by
commentators as being of potentially "great precedential value" because it
refused to "completely preclude judicial intrusions into the management of
detention facilities. "115 There has been, somewhat surprisingly, little follow-up
litigation after Bee.
Defendants Pleading Insanity. (a) At trial. Courts have also considered the
impact of involuntary medication on a defendant's right to the presentation
of an insanity defense at trial. 116 Several have ruled that a defendant has a
fundamental right to present his demeanor to the jury in an unmedicated state
when sanity is at issue; 117 others have found that a defendant has a right to
inform the jury as to the effects of such medication during trial, 118 and at least
one has found that a defendant has a right to be unmedicated at a pretrial
psychological evaluation. 119
Mental disability law jurisprudence seemed to take a dramatic turn recently,
though, in Riggins v. Nevada. 120 Riggins held that the use of antipsychotic
drugs violated defendant's right to fair trial (at which he had raised the insanity
defense), focusing on the drugs' potential side effects, and construing the court's
previous decision in Washington v. Harper 121 -limiting the rights of convicted
prisoners to refuse medication- to require "an overriding justification and a
determination of medical appropriateness" prior to forcibly administering
113
114

Bee v. Greaves, 744 F . 2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).

Osgood v. District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 1026 (D.D.C. 1983).
.
115Note, Bee v. Greaves: Pretrial Detention and the Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic DrugsA Missed Opportunity to Protect Fundamental Rights, 22 AM. CRIM. L. RJ!v. 836,853,856 (1985).
116
See e.g., Note, Medical Law-Unmedicated Defendants: The Two Prong Dilemma, 1 WEST. N. ENo.
L. REv. 995 (1985); Note, The Identification of Incompetent Defendants: Separating Those Urifit for
Adversary Combat From Those Who are Fit, 66 KY. L.J. 666 (1987).
117
See e.g., Commonwealth v. Lauraine, 390 Mass. 28, 453 N.E. 2d 437 (1983); SUlte v. Maryott, 6 Was.
App. 96,492 P . 2d 239 (1971).
111
See e.g., People v. Hardesty, 139 Mich. App. 124, 362 N.W. 2d 787 (1984); In re Pray, 133 Vt. 253,
336 A. 2d 174 (1975).
.
11
9J>eople v. Matthews, 148 A.D. 2d 272, 544 N.Y.S. 2d 398 (1989), app'I dismissed, 74 N.Y. 2d 950, 550
N.Y.S. 2d 585, 549 N.E. 2d 487 (1989).
120
112 S. Ct 1810 (1992). See generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6.
121
494 U.S. 210 (1990); see 2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.64A, at 62-74 (1992 pocket part).
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antipsychotic medications to a prisoner. 122 It focused on what might be called
the "litigational side effects" of antipsychotic drugs, and discussed the possibility that the drug use might have "compromised" the substance of the defendant's trial testimony, his interaction with counsel, and his comprehension of
the trial. 123
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy (the author of Harper) took an
even bolder position. He would not allow the use of antipsychotic medication
to make a defendant competent to stand trial "absent an extraordinary showing" on the state's part, and noted further that he doubted this showing could
be made "given our present understanding of the properties of these drugs." 124
Justice Thomas dissented, suggesting (i) the administration of the drug might
have increased the defendant's cognitive ability, 125 (ii) since Riggins had originally asked for medical assistance (while a jail inmate, he had "had trouble
sleeping" and was "hearing voices"), it could not be said that the state ever
"ordered" him to take mediation, 126 (iii) if Riggins had been aggrieved, his
proper remedy was a §1983 civil rights action, 127 and (iv) under the majority's
language, a criminal conviction might be reversed in cases involving "penicillin
or aspirin. " 128
(b) Following an NORI verdict. While individuals who had been previously
adjudicated NORI were members of some early class actions challenging institutional drugging practices, 129 there has been "remarkably" little litigation on
behalf of this population. 130 The most recent important case, a Maryland state
decision, construed Harper to guard against the arbitrary administration of
antipsychotic drugs in the context of NORI insanity acquittees, and declared
unconstitutional a state statute that failed to provide such a patient with the
rights to adequate notice, to be present, to present evidence, and to crossexamine witnesses at a drug refusal hearing, and to have the right to judicial
review of an adverse decision at such a hearing. 131 The Maryland court's reliance on both state and federal constitutions, thus suggests that lower courts
may limit Harper to the specific population in that case (convicted prisoners),
even where the patient's original confinement stems from the criminal trial
process.
Convicted Prisoners. The Supreme Court's decision in Washington v.
Harper sharply limited the right of convicted felons to refuse treatment under
122

Riggins, I 12 S. Ct at 1815.
/d. at 1816.
124
/d. at 1817 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
1
'"Id. at 1822-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Trial testimony had indicated that Riggins' daily drug regimen (800 mgs. of Mellaril) was enough to
"tranquilize an elephant," Id at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring)1 quoting trial record.
126
/d. at 1823-24 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
127
/d. at 1825-26. At his trial, Riggins had been sentenced to death.
128
/d, at 1826.
129
See e.g., Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915
(N.D. Ohio 1980).
1
l0perlin, supra note 91 at 47.
131
Williams v. Walzack, 319 Md. 485, 573 A. 2d 809 (1990), reconsid. den. (1990).
123
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the federal constitution. While the court agreed that prisoners (like all other
citizens) possessed a "significant libert! interest" in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs, 13 it found that the need to balance this
interest with prison safety and security consideration would lead it to uphold a
prison rule regulating drug refusals as long as it was "reasonably related to
legitimate penological interest," even where fundamental interests were otherwise implicated. 133 Thus, a state policy- that provided for an administrative
hearing (before a tribunal of mental health professionals and correctional officials) at which there was neither provision for the appointment of counsel nor
regularized external review -passed constitutional muster. 134
In a sharply worded opinion, Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the
refusal of medication was "a fundamental liberty interest deserving the highest
order of protection," especially where the imposition of such medications
might create "a substantial risk of permanent injury and premature death." 135
Harper clarifies an important strand of supreme court jurisprudence:
''prison security concerns will, virtually without exception, trump individual
autonomy interests." 136 Pre-Harper state cases had given prisoners far broader
rights to refuse under state constitutional provisions, 137 and the first post~
Harper scholarly analysis suggests that its influence on future state law developments will likely be "only hortatory"; 138 the Maryland NORI decision in
Williams v. Walczak appears to bear this out.
Perhaps the most interesting developments come in the way the Supreme
Court chose to read Harper in Riggins, just 2 years later. The difference in
outcomes may be traced to the difference in court perspectives; Riggins treated
Harper as a prison security case while it read Riggins as a fair trial case; yet,
· this difference in the litigants' legal status self-evidently has no effect on the
. physiological or neurological potential impact of the drugs in question. Nevertheless, side effects language in Harper (subordinated there because of security
reasons) is privileged in Riggins (where such issues are absent) by nature of the
court's consideration of the question in the context of a fair trial issue. Justice
Thomas's opinion raises grave issues for defense counsel; had his position
prevailed, would concerned and competent defense lawyers feel as if they
were assuming a risk in ever seeking psychiatric help for an awaiting-trial
defendant? 139 His analogizing antipsychotic drug side effects to penicillin ·or
aspirin may be disingenuous or it may be cynical. What is clear is that nowhere
132

Harper, 494 U.S. at 221, quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-91 (1980).
/d. at 223.
134
/d. at 223-24.
133

135

/d. at 241 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
2 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.64A, at 72 (1992 pocket part).
137
See e.g., Keyhea v. Rushen, 178 Cal. App. 3d 526, 223 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1986); Large v. Superior Court,
148 Ariz. 229, 714 P. 2d 399 (1986).
138Appelbaum, Washington v. Harper: Prisoners' Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication, 41 HOSP. &
CoMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 731, 732 (1990).
139Compare Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987) (no error to admit, in rebuttal of defendant's
"extreme emotional disturbance" defense, report prepared following pretrial detainee's request to be treated
at state hospital pending trial), discussed in 3 M.L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §16.04A, at 425-29.
136
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in the lengthy corpus of "right to refuse treatment" litigation is this position
ever seriously raised. 140
Competency to Be Executed. Still undecided is the important question of
whether a state can involuntarily medicate an individual under a death sentence
so as to make him competent to be executed. After the Supreme Court determined that an incompetent defendant cannot be executed 141 (a holding that it
did not extended to cases involving mentally retarded individuals), 142 it agreed
to hear, in Perry v. Louisiana, a case that posed this precise question. 143
In Perry, the Louisiana state courts had found that any due process right
the capital defendant might have was outweighed by two compelling state
interests: the provision of psychiatric care, and the carrying out of a valid
death penalty. 144 After the Supreme Court originally decided to hear the case
(to determine whether the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment prohibits states from so medicating death row inmates),
it ultimately vacated the lower court's decision and remanded for further proceedings in light of its decision in Harper on the scope of a convicted prisoner's
right to refuse. 145
The Supreme Court's reasoning in this case is not clear. It may be that the
justices felt, upon reflection, that the only issue presented was that of forcible
medication (finding the execution consequences irrelevant), and it was thus
necessary for the state court to consider, after Harper, whether the difference
in long-term harm in a case such as Perry (his execution) outweighed the state's
interest in involuntarily medicating him. 146 Interestingly, the Supreme Court
had decided Harper a week before it chose to grant certiorari in Perry; its
decision to vacate and remand for consideration of Harper may thus mean that
the court could not - or would not - resolve the difficult tensions presented by
such a case.
Decoding the Right to Refuse Treatment

As I have sought to demonstrate, the jurisprudence of the right to refuse
treatment is complex. Separate bodies of doctrine have developed in parallel
court systems and in cases involving civil and criminal litigants. The Supreme
1
"°The only case in which a similar issue is raised is Matter of Salisbury, 138 Misc. 2d 361,524 N.Y.S. 2d
352, 354 (Sup. Ct. 1988), holding that prior court authorization was not necessary before a state mental
hospital could administer antibiotics to a patient, citing "overwhelming public policy considerations" that
made it "imperative" that hospitals could perform such "routine, accepted, nonmajor medical treatment
which poses no significant risk, discomfort, or trauma to the patient." Salisbury has never been cited in any
subsequent case nor has it been mentioned in the law review literature.
141
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
142
See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
143
110 S. Ct. 1317, 56 U.S.L.W. 3584 (1990).
144
State v. Perry, 543 So. 2d 487 (La. 1989), rehearing den., 545 So. 2d 1049 (1989).
145
Perry v. Louisiana, 111 S. Ct. 449 (1990), reh. denied, 111 S. Ct. 804 (1991). The Louisiana Supreme
Court subsequently has ruled that drugging Perry to make him competent to be executed would violate the
state constitution. State v. Perry, 608 So. 2d 594 (La. 1992).
146
3 M. L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §17.06B, at 208 (1992 pocket part); Supreme Court Sidesteps Issue of
Restoring Inmates' Competency IC? Allow Execution, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Dec. 21, 1990).
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Court's decisions in Youngberg v. Romeo and Mills v. Rogers led to an exodus
from federal courts, but its recent opinion in Riggins v. Nevada may augur a
return to that forum. Some courts choose to read the social science literature
on side effects carefully while others profess that they are unable to make
meaningful distinctions among the data. In 2 years time, the Supreme Court
has nearly done a complete "about face" in its reading of the same evidence.
There has been virtually no litigation in cases involving some of the most
important "categories" of potential right to refuse litigants in "other" settings.
The vast majority of litigation has involved antipsychotic drugs, although
commentators and a handful of cases raise the question of the application of
the doctrine to a full range of other treatments.
Is it possible to extract meaningful doctrinal coherence from these conflicting findings? My reading of nearly 2 decades of legal developments in this
area suggests that sense can be made only if we first look at a question that is
rarely asked in this context: why has the law developed as it has in this volatile
area?
And here I think we can make some sense, if we look at the roots of judicial
attitudes toward decision making in such cases. To do this, I tum to a series of
constructs that should help illuminate this answer-to heuristics, to sanism,
and to pretextuality. After I consider their impact, I will place my findings in
a therapeutic jurisprudence filter in an effort to "decode" right to refuse treatment law.
Jurisprudential Constructs
Heuristics. 147 "Heuristics" is a cognitive psychology construct that refers to
implicit thinking devices that individuals use to oversimplifY complex, information-processing tasks. The use of these heuristic devices often leads to distorted and systematically erroneous decisions, and causes decision makers to
148
"ignore or misuse items of rationally useful information. " The "vividness"
heuristic thus teaches us that one single vivid, memorable case overwhelms
mountains of abstract, colorless data upon which rational choi~es should be
made. 149 It is important to understand that mental health professionals are just
as susceptible to the use of these devices as are judges, jurors, legislators, or
lay persons. 150
'"The material i,ifra accompanying notes 148-Sl is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 49, manuscript at 79-82.
i.asee e.g., Perlin, supra note 10, at 966 n. 46, quoting, in part, Carroll & Payne, The Psychology of the

Parole Decision Process: A Joint Application of Attribution Theory and I,iformation-Processing Psychology, in COONITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 13, 21 (J. Carroll & J. Payne eds. 1976).
"9Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial Policy 19 STAN, LAW, 10, 13 (1~84).
1
'°See e.g., C. WEBSTER, R. MENZIES & M. JACKSON, CLINICAL AssBSSMENTS BEFORE TRIAL 121
(1982); Jackson, The Clinical Assessment and Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Scientific Analysis,
16 CRIM. JuST. & BEHAV. 114 (1989); Jackson, Psychiatric Decision-Making for the Courts: Judges,
Psychiatrists, Lay People? 9 INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY .507 (1986). On juror use of heuristic reasoning, see
Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 u.
CAL, DAVIS L. REV, 1013, l0S0 (1991); Koehler & Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy
Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 1S CORNELL L. REv. 247, 264-65 (1990);
see also, Roberts & Golding, The Social Construction of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity, lS LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 349, 372 (1991) (jurors' preexisting attitudes toward insanity defense strongest predictor of
individual verdicts). On legislative use of heuristic reasoning, see Perlin, supra note 32, at 128.
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Thus, through the "availability" heuristic, we judge the probability or frequency of an event based upon the ease with which we recall it. Through the
''typification" heuristic, we characterize a current experience via reference to
past stereotypical behavior; through the "attribution" heuristic, we interpret a
wide variety of additional information to reinforce preexisting stereotypes;
through the "myth of particularistic proofs," we erroneously assume that casespecific (anecdotal) information is qualitatively different from base-rate (statistical) information. Through the "hindsight bias," we exaggerate how easily we
could have predicted an event beforehand. Through the "outcome bias," we
base our evaluation of a decision on our evaluation of an outcome. isi
Sanism. 152 "Sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. is It infects
both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. 1s4 Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based largely upon stereotype, myth,
superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our
use of false "ordinary common sense"1ss and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process.
151
See generally, Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REv. 3, 13-18, 29-30 (1990), citing, inter alia JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) (JUDGMENT); s.
BREHM & J. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A T°HEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL (1981); R.
NISBETT & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980);
REASONING, INFERENCE, AND JUDGMENT IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY (D. Turk & P. Salovey eds. 1988) (all
discussing heuristics in general); Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 S.M.U. L. REv. 329 (1992)
(same); Doob & Roberts, Social Psychology, Social Attitudes and Attitudes Toward Sentencing, 16 CANAD.
J. BBEHAV. Sci. 269 (1984) (vividness effect); Diamond & Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency. in
Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 73 (1989) (same); Van Zandt, Common Sense Reasoning, Social Change,
and the Law, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 894 (1988) (typification); Kelley, The Process of Causal Attribution, 28
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 107 (1973) (attribution); Russell, The Causal Dimension Scale: A Measure of How
Individuals Perceive Causes, 42 J. PERSONALITY & Soc'L PSYCHOLOGY 1137 (1982) (same); Saks & Kidd,
Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, IS LAW & Soc'y REv. 123, 151
(1980-81) (particularistic proofs); Arkes, Principles in Judgment/Decision Making Research Pertinent to
Legal Procedures, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 429 (1989) (hindsight and outcome biases); Fischoff, Hindsight:#Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, l J. Exper. Psychology:
Hum. Percept. & Perform. 288 (1985) (both biases); Dawson Arkes, Siciliano, Blinkhorn, Lakshmanan & Petrelli, Hindsight Bias: An Impediment to Accurate Probability Estimation in Clinicopathologic Conferences, 8 MED. DEc1s. MAKINO 259 (1988) (hindsight bias); Baron & Hershey, Outcome
Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. PERSONAL. & Soc'L PSYCHOLOGY 569 (1988).
"2The material infra text accompanying notes 153-66 is generally adapted from Perlin, On "Sanism, » 46
S.M.U. L. REv. 373-77, 397-98 (1992), Perlin, supra note 49, manuscript at 78-82 and Perlin & Dorfman,
supra note 6, manuscript at 17-21.
153
The classic study is G. ALLPORT, THE NATIJRE OF PREJUDICE (1955).
1
"'The phrase "sanism" was, to the best of my knowledge, coined by Dr. Morton Birnbaum. See Birnbaum,
The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on its Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
HEALTH CARE 97, 106-07 (F. Ayd ed. 1974); Koe v. Califano, 573 F. 2d 761, 764 n. 12 (2d Cir. 1978). I
discuss this insight of Birnbaum's in Perlin, supra note 32, at 92-93.
'
msee Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6, manuscript at 21-22; Perlin,supra note 49, manuscript-at 28 n. 69;
see generally, Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions,
136 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (1988) (discussing "ordinary common sense" [OCS)).
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. !udges are not immune from sanism. "[E]mbedded in the cultural presuopos1t1ons that engulf us all/' 156 they express discomfort with social science 1'., (or
any other system that may appear to challenge law's hegemony over society)
and display skepticism about new thinking; this discomfort and skepticism
allow them to take deeper refuge in heuristic thinking that perpetuates the
myths and stereotypes of sanism. m
Judges reflect and project the conventional morality of the community, and
judicial decisions in all areas of civil and criminal mental disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes. m Their language demonstrates bias against mentally disabled individuals 160 and contempt for the mental health professions. 161 At least one court has, without citation to any
authority, found that it is less likely that medical patients will "fabricate descriptions of their complaints" than will "psychological patients."162 Another
court has likened psychiatric predictivity of future dangerousness to predictions made by an oncologist as to consequences of an untreated and metastasized malignancy, 163 in spite of the overwhelming weight of clinical and behavioral literature that concludes that psychiatrists are far more often incorrect in
predicting dangerousness than they are accurate. 164
Courts often appear impatient with mentally disabled litigants, ascribing
their problems in the legal process to weak character or poor resolve. Thus, a
popular sanist myth is that: "Mentally disabled individuals simply don't try
hard enough. They give in too easily to their basest instincts, and do not
exercise appropriate self-restraint." 165 A trial judge who responded to a Na1

'6J>'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 329, 332
(1991).
157

Perlin, supra note 151, at 59-61; see generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6.

158

Perlin, supra note 151, at 61-69.
'"See Perlin, supra note 152, at 400-04.
160
See e.g., Corn v. Zant, 708 F. 2d 549, 569 (11th Cir. 1983), reh. den., 714 F. 2d 159 (11th Cir. 1983),
cert.den., 467 U.S. 1220 (1984) (defendant referred to as a "lunatic"); Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F. 2d
1516, 1522 (I Ith Cir., 1987), quoting Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F. 2d 213 (5th Cir. 1974) (using "lunatic");
Brown v. People, 8 Ill. 2d 540, 134 N.E. 2d 760, 762 (1956) Oudge asked defendant, "You are not crazy at
this time, are you?"); Pyle v. Boles, 250 F. Supp. 285, 289 (N.D. W. Va. 1966) (trial judge accused habeas
petitioner of"being crazy"); but ef, State v. Penner, 772 P. 2d 819 (Kan. 1989) (unpublished disposition), at
•3 (witnesses admonished not to refer to defendant as "crazy" or "nuts").
161
See e.g., Commonwealth v. Musolino, 320 Pa. Super. 425, 467 A. 2d 605 (1983) (reversible error for
trial judge to refer to expert witnesses as "headshrinkers"); compare State v. Percy, 146 Vt. 475, 507 A. 2d
955, 956 (1986), opp'/ qfter remand,-Vt.-, 595 A. 2d 248 (1990), cert. den., 112 S. Ct. 344 (1991)
(conviction reversed where prosecutor, in closing argument, referred to expert testimony as "psychobabble").
162
People v. LaLone, 432 Mich. 103,437 N.W. 2d 611,613 (1989), reh. den. (1989).
163

/n re Melton, 597 A. 2d 892, 898 (D.C. 1991).
•
See e.g., J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981); Monahan, Risk
Assessment of Violence Among the Mentally Disordered: Generating Useful Knowledge, 11 INT'L J. L. &
PSYCHIATRY 249 (1989); Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 48
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511 (1992); Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 u. PA. L. REV. 97 (1984).
165
Perlin, supra note 152, at 396; see also, e.g., Balkin, The Rhetoric of Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REv.
197, 238 (1990) (Hinckley prosecutor suggested to jurors, "if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were
largefy his own fault"); State v. Duckworth, 496 So. 2d 624, 635 (La. App. 1986) Ouror who felt defendant
would be responsible for actions as long as he "wanted to do them" not excused for cause) (no error).
164
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tional Center for State Courts survey indicated that, in his mind, defendants
who were 1ST could have understood and communicated with counsel and the
court "if they [had] only wanted." 166
Pretextua/ity. 167 The entire relationship between the legal proces and mentally disabled litigants is often pretextual. 168 This pretextuality is poisonous;
it infects all players, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans
participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judging, and, at times,
perjurious and/or corrupt testifying. The reality is well known to frequent
consumers of judicial services in this area: to mental health advocates and
other public defender /legal aid/legal service lawyers assigned to represent patients and mentally disabled criminal defendants, to prosecutors and state
attorneys assigned to represent hospitals, to judges who regularly hear such
cases, to expert and lay witnesses, and, most importantly, to the mentally
disabled person involved in the litigation in question.
The Connection to Right to Refuse Treatment Law. The seemingly incoherent splits in right to refuse decision making can thus be explained by consideration of these jurisprudential constructs. Judges that employ heuristic devices,
make sanist assumptions, and employ pretextual thinking decide cases that
ignore social science data, privilege myths, and misstate established legal doctrine. Others, contrarily, read social science data carefully, avoid sanist
thought processes and reject pretextual decision making.
The split between the panel and the en bane Fourth Circuit in United States
v. Charters 169 or the differences between the majority and the dissent in Riggins
v. Nevada 110 perfectly mirror this dichotomy. The Charters I court carefully
analyzed the available social science data as to the prevalence and severity of
1
~.

Gould, I. Keilitz & J. R. Martin, "Criminal Defendants with Trial Disabilities: The Theory and
Practice of Competency Assistance" (unpublished manuscript), at 68; see also, Lamb, Deinstitutionali:r.ation
and the Homeless Mentally Ill, 35 HHOSP. & COMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 899, 943 (1984) (society tends to
"morally disapprove of [mentally disabled] persons who 'give in' to their dependency needs"). Compare
Matter of Commitment of Tarpley, 581 N.E. 2d 1251 (Ind. 1991), reh. den. (1992) (error to hold defendant
in contempt of court for failing to take medication as required by outpatient commitment).
167
The material i11fra accompanying note 168 is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 49, manuscript
atl0-11.
168
By "pretextual," I mean that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and
engage similarly in dishonest (frequently meretricious) decision making, see Perlin, Morality and Pretextual-

ity, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance,
19 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991), specifically where witnesses, especially expert
witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends,"
Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 839, 840 (1974). Compare
Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puule: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the Supreme
Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 KY. L. J. 1 n. 1 (1990-91) (defining "pretexts" to include
situations where "the government offers a justification for activity that, if the motivation of the (police]
officer is not considered, would be a legally sufficient justification for the activity'' as well as those activities
for which the proffered justification is "legally insufficient").
169
829 F. 2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987) (Charters /), on rehearing, 863 F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane)
(Charters II), cert. den., 110 S. Ct. 1317 (1990}; see generally, Perlin, supra note 10.
10
' 112

U.S. 1810 (1992).
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side effects. 171 The Charters II court, on the other hand, rejected as incredulous
the possibility that a court could make a meaningful distinction between competency to stand trial and competency to engage in medication decision
making:
[Such a distinction] must certainly be of such subtlety and complexity as to tax perception by the most skilled medical or psychiatric
professionals ... To suppose that it is a distinction that can be
fairly discerned and applied even by the most skilled judge on the
basis of an adversarial fact-finding proceeding taxes credulity. 172
The Charters II court was correct in its observation that "while there is'
universal agreement in the professional discipline that side effects always exist
as a risk, there is wide disagreement within those disciplines as to the degree of
their severity." 173 While this is certainly true, this does not excuse the court
from refusing to critically analyze the scientific research in coming to its ultimate decision. 174
In the course of its decision, the Charters II court thus revealed its "apprehensiveness about dealing with underlying social, psychodynamic, and political
issues that form the overt and hidden agendas in any right to refuse case. " 175
The court's decision also incorporated a broad array of heuristic devices in a
way that led to the trivialization and misuse of the social science data before
it. 176 Through the employment of these devises, it:
... abdicated its responsibilities to read, harmonize, distinguish,
and analyze social science data on the issues before it. It not only
inadequately addressed the issue of side effects, but it also failed to
adequately address issues concerning competency determinations,
the therapeutic value of decision making, the empirical results of an
announcement of a right to refuse treatment, and the courts' role in
such processes. 177
·
This trivialization of social science serves additional instrumental ends.
It allows courts to more comfortably seek refuge in expressing commonsense "morality," to employ heuristic devices in a wide variety of c~ses in
171
172
173

Charters, 829 F. 2d at 489 n. 2.
Charters, 863 F. 2d at 120.

/d. at 311 .

1

"See Perlin, supra note 10, at 990-92; compare Monahan & Walker, Judicial" Use of Social Science
Research, lS LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 571, 582-83 (1991) (setting out steps to be used by couns in analyzing
social science evidence). As Professors Monahan and Walker observed in a different context on the question
of judicial self-professed scientific illiteracy, "Anyone who can comprehend the Federal Ton Claims Act
can learn what standard deviation and statistical significance mean." Monahan & Walker, Social Authority:
Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, Sil n. 119 (1986).
17

'Perlin, supra note 10, at 966.
Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6, manuscript at 46.

176
177

Perlin, supra note 10, at 999.
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"uncomfortable" areas of the law, and to use sanist behavior in deciding such
cases. 178
The Supreme Court's turnaround between Washington v. Harper and Riggins appears puzzling, and the two opinions seem virtually irreconcilable if
they are both read as "right to refuse treatment cases.'' However, if Harper is
seen as a prison security case, and Riggins as a fair trial case, then the rationales
for the differences become clearer. Because the court, for a variety of normative and instrumental reasons, needed to reiterate strong prison security values,
it decided Harper pretextually. 179 Since this issue was absent from Riggins
(who had not yet been convicted at the time of the employment of forced
medications), the majority did not need to resort to such pretexts in its decision.
Even here, though, Justice Thomas's dissent reflects both sanism and
pretextuality. His opinion raises grave questions for defense counsel:
had his position prevailed, would defense lawyers have felt as if they were
"assuming a risk" in ever seeking pretrial medical help for defendants awaiting
trial? 180 His analogizing psychiatric drug side effects to penicillin or aspirin
may be disingenuous or it may be cynical. What is clear is that nowhere in
the len~thy corpus of right to refuse litigation is this position ever seriously
raised.' 1
The same methodology can perhaps be used to explain the lack of judicial
attention that has been paid to such questions as the application of the right to
refuse treatment to individuals found permanently incompetent to stand trial,
awaiting trial in jai}$, or institutionalized following insanity acquittals, to other
potentially invasive treatments beyond antipsychotic drugs (such as electroshock therapy or aversive conditioning, or to community or private facility
settings. But here the blame can probably be more realistically placed on counsel than on the judiciary.
Lawyers representing mentally disabled individuals must familiarize themselves with information about the right to refuse treatment, both as to the law
and as to the pharmacology. 182 The track record of lawyers representing the
17

'The Charters II opinion

. . . reflects inappropriate heuristic thinking in a variety of contexts. It uses such distorting
devices as availability, typification, the myth of particularistic proofs, and the "vividness
effect" ... The opinion's attempts to simplify one of the most complex problems facing
decision makers, assessing mentally disabled individuals' capacity to retain some autonomous
decision making power, further reflects the pernicious effect of the heuristic of attribution
theory.
Perlin, supra note 10, at 986-87 (footnotes omitted).
179
See 2 M. L. PERLIN, supra note 3, §5.64A, at 69-72 (Pocket part), discussing Justice Stevens' opinion
critiquing the majority's read of the factual record in Harper.
1
1()Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1823-24 (Thomas, J, , dissenting), discussed in Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6,
manuscript at 40-41.
111
See Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6, manuscript at 41-42, and see id. at 42 n. 117, discussing Matter of
Salisbury, 138 Misc. 2d 361, 524 N.Y.S, 2d 352,354 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (no right to refuse antibiotics), the only
case in which a similar issue is raised.
·
112
See generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6, manuscript at 60-61.
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mentally disabled has ranged from indifferent to wretched; 183 in one famous
survey, lawyers were so bad that a patient had a better chance of being released
at a commitment hearing if he had appeared pro se. 184 Further, simply educating lawyers about psychiatric technique and psychological nomenclature does
not materially improve lawyers' performance where underlying attitudes are
not changed. 185 If counsel is to become even minimally competent in this area,
it is critical that the underlying issues here be confronted. 186 This is underscored
by judges' lack of basic knowledge about mental disability law; in one astonishing case, a Louisiana civil commitment order was reversed where the trial court
did not even know of the existence of a state-mandated mental health advocacy
service. 187
If lawyers continue to abdicate their advocacy role, it is not surprising that
so many areas of application of the right to refuse treatment remain judicially
unexplored.

Therapeutic Jurisprudence 188
"Therapeutic jurisprudence" studies the role of the law as a therapeutic
agent. 189 This perspective recognizes that substantive rules, legal procedures,
183
See Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases,
16 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 39, 43-45 (1992); see also, e.g., Schwartz, Damage Actions as a Strategy for
Enhancing the Quality of Care of Persons With Mental Disabilities, 17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
651, 662 (1989-90) (describing "wholesale lack of legal advocacy" available to patients in public mental
institutions).
184
Andalman & Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic,
and a Proposal, 4S MISS. L.J. 43, 72 (1974). One half of the lawyers assigned to represent individuals in
civil commitment cases in Dallas were unaware of the existence of either of the two treatises written
specifically about Texas's mental health law. Shuman & Hawkins, The Use of Alternatives to Institutionalir.ation of the Mentally Ill, 33 Sw. L.J. ll81, 1193-94 (1980) (attorneys received $25 per case); accord,
Perlin, supra note 183, at son. 66 (Virginia attorneys received $25 per case as of 1984).
mPoythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope With Expert Testimony, 2 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 1, IS (1978). There is similar evide_nce in other areas of the law that
knowledge alone is an insufficient impetus for attitudinal change. See e.g., Bohm, Clark & Aveni, Knowledge and Death Penalty Opinion: A Test of the Marshall Hypothesis, 28 J · REs. CRIME & DELIN7DQ. 360
(1991).

'~or a rare judicial acknowledgement of the impact of lawyer incompetency in another area where
inadequate counsel leads to morally intolerable results, see Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P. 2d 70, 104 (Wyo.
1991) (Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting in part & concurring in part) ("We .•. let 'chiropractors' with law degrees
perform the equivalent of brain surgery in capital cases, and, predictably, the 'patient' often dies. This is
intolerable.'').
187

/n re C.P.K., 516 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (La. App. 19878).
8The material ifllra accompanyi~g notes 189-92 is generally adapted from Perlin & Dorfman, supra note
6, manuscript at S6-S1.
189
See THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT, supra note 20; ESSAYS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (D. Wexler & B. Winick eds. 1991); Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisp"'dence and
Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, ll BEHAV. Sci. & L.-(1992) (in print); Wexler, Putting
Mental Health in Mental Health Law, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992) (Wexler, Putting Mental Health);
Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisp"'dence and Criminal Justice Mental Health Issues, 16 MENT. & PHYS.
Dis. L. RPTR. 225 (1992); Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic Jurisp"'dence as a New Approach to Mental
Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 4S U. MIAMI L. REv. 979 (1991) (Wexler & Winick, New
Approach).
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and lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences,
and questions whether such rules, procedures, and roles can or should be
reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating
due process principles. 190
While an impressive body of literature has been produced, 191 there has not
yet been a systematic investigation into the reasons why some courts decide
cases "therapeutically" and others "antitherapeutically." My preliminary conclusion is that sanism is such a dominant psychological force that it (a) distorts
"rational" decision making, (b) encourages (albeit on at least a partially unconscious level) pretextuality, and (c) prevents decision makers from intelligently
and coherently focusing on questions that are meaningful to therapeutic jurisprudential inquiries. 192
lj I
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In Right to Refuse Treatment Cases. 193 It should be intuitively self-evident
that the area of the right to refuse treatment is as fertile a field as one can
imagine for the application of these insights. There is truly a broad array
of topics for scholars to examine: the "real world" implications of decisions
expanding (or contracting) the substantive right to refuse, and the scope of
procedural due process protections available to right to refuse invokers; 194 the
impact of what Stanley Brodsky has called "litigaphobia"195 (and what may
simply be a rarified form of passive-aggressive behavior) 196 in mental health
professionals' responses to court orders mandating the right to refuse; 197 the
postinstitutional impact of refusal; 198 the implications of what Thomas Gutheil
and his colleagues have called "critogenesis" (meaning the "inherent risks of
legal intervention in medical decisionmaking" 199 in right to refuse litigation);
•~exler, Health Care Compliance Principles and the Insanity Acquittee Conditional Release Process, 27
CRIM. L. BULL. 18, 19 n. S (1991); see generally, Wexler, Putting Mental Health, supra note 189.
191
See Wexler & Winick, New Approach, supra note 189, at 981 n. 9.
192
See M. Perlin, supra note 56 (suggesting that influence of sanism must be considered in therapeutic
jurisprudence investigations).
193
Much of the text if!/ra accompanying notes 194-202 is generally adapted from Perlin, supra note 9, at
54-SS.
194
See 2 M. L . PERLIN, supra note 3, at §§5.47-5 .51; Perlin, supra note 49, at 104 n. 245.
195
See Brodsky, Fear of Litigation in Mental Health Professionals, IS CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 492, 497
(1988).
196
Zito, Haimotitz, Wanderling & Mehta, supra note SO.
197
1 discuss Brodsky's and Zita's insights in this context in Perlin, supra note JO, at 989 n. 211, and id. at
984-85.
198
Compare Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1299-1300 (D.N.J. 1979) (antipsychotic drugs also serve
to "inhibit a patient's ability to learn social skills needed to fully recover from psychosis"), to In re Melton,
565 A. 2d 635, 649 (D.C. 1989) (Schwelb, J ., dissenting), vacated and rehearing granted, 581 A. 2d 788
(1990), superceded on rehearing, 597 A. 2d 892 (D.C. 1991):

I am constrained to wonder how many of the homeless persons who live wretched and
squalid lives •• . are there because they have ''won," through litigation or the threat thereof,
. •• the "liberty" not to be required to take medication essential to their mental health.
199
See Gutheil, Burstzajn, Kaplan & Brodsky, Participation in Competency Assessment and Treatment
Decisions: The Role of the Psychiatrist-Attorney Team, II MENT, & PHYS. Dis. L. RPTR. 446,449 (1987).
I discuss this criticism in Perlin, supra note 32, at 88-89 n. 15 I .
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the extent to which courts are even willing to consider the underlying social
science data. 200
·
We have not even skimmed the surface of this important investigation; if
scholars and researchers turn their attention to it seriously, it adds one more
important set of factors "into the mix" that must be considered in making
predictions about future judicial behavior. 201

Conclusion
In order to understand right to refuse treatment law, we must decode it. It
is not enough to simply discuss the right as a ''turf battle" between patients'
rights lawyers and clinicians or as a trompe d'oei/ effect (that reflects either a
series of fixed constitutional principles or of treatment decisions). As I have
sought to demonstrate in this article, the right remains the most volatile area
of mental disability law but it is one that can be contextualized if the jurisprudential and cognitive constructs just discussed are always kept in mind.
The general conservative trend of the federal courts has created a "shadow
land" of right to refuse litigation in state courts, a universe that will most
likely continue to grow both quantitatively and qualitatively, but that will be
recalibrated as a result of the Supreme Court's recent Riggins decision. The
split in the courts reflects radically different visions of the role of the judiciary
in overseeing institutional conditions and care. While there is a substantial
body of right to refuse law dealing with certain discrete populations, many
other important subclasses have been the subject of negligible litigation;
whether or not these become "growth areas" in the near and distant future
depends largely on the extent to which counsel begins to serve a true representational role in this area. It is necessary that the precise status of the patiente.g., jail detainee; prisoner; insanity acquittee; Jacksonized permanently incompetent- be "unpacked" so as to "decode" the operative, controlling legal
principles. Finally, it is not enough to simply look at the issue as if it reflects
only questions of "patients' rights" or ''treaters' autonomy." It is also necessary
to weigh and consider cognitive psychology insights, constructs such as "sanism" and "pretextuality," and therapeutic jurisprudence principles into our
data base to help understand why courts do what they do and what the ultimate
impact of their actions will be.
If all of this is done, it is possible that some harmony might be brought to
this area of litigation, and that the dilemma at the heart of the controversy"preserving patient dignity while maintaining allegiance to treatment
needs"202 - might yet be resolved.

zaiSee generally, Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 6.
1 consider Riggins in this context in M. Perlin, supra note 56, and Perlin, supra note 21.
202
Roth, supra note 56, at 161.
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